While Serbia continues to rely on the 1999 UN Security Council resolution, ill will and resentment will continue to dominate relations with Kosovo – and normalisation will remain a distant goal.
Whenever the subject of Kosovo’s independence is under discussion, Serbia automatically defaults to United Nations Resolution 1244, which the UN Security Council adopted on June 10, 1999, immediately after the cessation of hostilities 25 years ago.
The resolution established a provisional self-government for Kosovo under UN auspices via the UN Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, pending a final status agreement to be negotiated through the political process with Serbia.
Negotiations proved unsuccessful and Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on February 17, 2008. Since then, it has considered itself an independent, sovereign state.
But Serbia claims the UN resolution, which has never been abrogated, includes an inviolate recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and, in the absence of a negotiated status agreement, Kosovo is not independent and remains an integral part of Serbia.
While there is nothing new about this construct, it is worth raising it now because on June 8, the inaugural “All-Serbian Assembly”, a large group of representatives from Serbia and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, met in Belgrade and issued the “Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People”.
The declaration contained 49 articles, including three that are directly related to Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, including two that refer specifically to UN Resolution 1244:
The first of these says the Assembly affirms that “Kosovo and Metohija are inalienable parts of the Republic of Serbia”.
The second asserts that the Assembly “supports the efforts of the Republic of Serbia in preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty, guaranteed by international law and UN Security Council Resolution 1244”.
The third says the Assembly “insists on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in all its aspects”.
The latter article goes on to say that “the implementation of the Brussels Agreement” signed between Belgrade and Pristina, “the formation of the Community of Serbian Municipalities” to represent the Serb minority’s interests in northern Kosovo, and continuous dialogue, are “the only sustainable paths to solving the problem” of Kosovo.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was quoted on June 9 in Kosovo Online about the “obligation to respect Resolution 1244”. He then echoed the sentiments expressed in these three articles, stressing “dialogue” as the way forward.
While these sentiments sound constructive, one can reasonably ask how Serbia’s reliance on Resolution 1244 can be reconciled with the requirements of the Brussels and Ohrid agreements of 2023, which resulted from the dialogue between the two countries.
Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dacic also referred to the importance of Resolution 1244 in a story published by Serbia’s Tanjug news agency on June 10. Dacic was quoted as saying: “We believe the international order rests upon UNSC decisions – for us, the resolution is still current and valid and everyone must comply with it, even though there has been no respect for it for over 20 years.”
Resolution 1244 includes the following language in Appendix 2, paragraph 8, regarding the principles that must be followed in resolving the “Kosovo crisis”, as it was referred to: “A political process towards … substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the … principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia …” (The FRY no longer exists, of course, but this provision is understood to apply to Serbia.)
But is this reliance valid?
Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Serbia asked the UN General Assembly to refer the matter to the UN’s International Court of Justice, seeking an advisory opinion as to whether Kosovo’s declaration was contrary to Resolution 1244 and international law. Many other countries expressed their opinions to the court, either in support of, or opposition to, Serbia’s position, because a ruling could have ramifications for other countries with restive territories.
The court issued its opinion in July 2010. It contained a lengthy and detailed analysis of Resolution 1244 and concluded: “The court accordingly finds that Security Council Resolution 1244 did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from issuing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia. Hence the declaration of independence did not violate Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).”
Shouldn’t this opinion have ended the debate? No, for the following reasons.
First, the opinion is advisory, so countries can decide for themselves whether to accept it or not. Indeed, five countries of the EU refuse to recognise Kosovo.
Also, noticeably absent from the court’s opinion is any reference to Kosovo’s “statehood”, which can be considered a different issue from the legality of a declaration of independence. And, importantly, Serbia has Russia on its side – a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power.
Thus, Serbia continues to rely on Resolution 1244, even though about 100 countries, including the US and a large majority of EU countries, recognise Kosovo’s statehood.
Dialogue continues amid rancour
Despite Belgrade’s intransigent reliance on Resolution 1244, Serbia and Kosovo have continued to participate in the dialogue process intended to normalise relations between the two countries. And they reached a stunning “Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia” in Brussels in February 2023, and an “Implementation Annex” in Ohrid in March 2023.
Notably, the preamble to the agreement acknowledges that “the inviolability of frontiers and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty … are a basic condition of peace.”
It also states that the Agreement is “without prejudice to the different view of the Parties on fundamental questions, including on status questions”. Thus, the Agreement tacitly acknowledges the continued vitality of Resolution 1244.
But the specific articles of the agreement move the parties away from the resolution, and bring them much closer to normalisation, consistent with the overall objective.
Unfortunately, however, there have been repeated violations of the 2023 agreement on both sides, and the parties are no closer to normalisation than before. A couple of examples illustrate the point.
Article 4 says that “Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation”. Almost before the ink had dried on the documents, Serbia objected to Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe, and has continued to do so. While Kosovo’s application has advanced during the multi-stage approval process, the outcome remains uncertain because the Council of Europe’s ministers, who have the final say, have not yet voted.
Kosovo would also like to obtain membership of the most important international organisation of all, the United Nations. To become a member, a ‘state’ must apply and be endorsed by the UN General Assembly, subject to any veto, so Kosovo is at the mercy of Serbia’s ally, Russia, which has veto power, and thus far Moscow’s position has been a resounding ‘no’.
Another highly significant provision is Article 7, which requires both parties to ensure “an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo”. This article has become the Holy Grail for Serbia, and nothing else of significance will happen until this has been accomplished.
Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti, President Vjosa Osmani and the speaker of the Kosovo Assembly agreed in writing that if Serbia would not object to Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe, Kosovo would put forward a proposal for a Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities. I have argued that this promise could result in a breakthrough on the path to normalisation, but Serbia has continued with its opposition.
Another example, which I cite primarily for Serbia’s cynical reaction, is Article 8, which envisions the exchange of permanent missions in the two countries’ respective capitals.
As Serbian Foreign Minister Dacic put it: “To build upon this science fiction spirit from Pristina, I want to tell them that they are more likely to open an embassy on the Moon than in Belgrade.”
Crisis follows crisis
There are numerous other examples of non-compliance. And all the while, conditions on the ground have continued to deteriorate, particularly in the Serb-majority north: the licence plate controversy; Kosovo Serbs’ boycott of local elections; the riots causing injuries to many NATO Kosovo Force soldiers; the attack by an armed Serbian gang in Banjska and the dinar debacle, among other crises. These were all accompanied by mutual recriminations and inflammatory rhetoric. Both sides bear responsibility in varying degrees.
There was a session of the dialogue in Brussels on June 26 after a lengthy hiatus following the Banjska attack last September, but no progress was made. As a new wrinkle, Prime Minister Kurti insisted on certain preconditions before engaging further: signing documents which President Vucic has refused to do; turning over to Kosovo the mastermind of the Banjska attack; and withdrawing an inflammatory letter to the EU by then Prime Minister Ana Brnabic last December in which she staunchly refuted any possibility of de facto or de jure recognition of Kosovo, referring to Resolution 1244.
Vucic rejected Kurti’s preconditions, and everyone went home empty-handed.
The point of this discussion should be clear: as long as Resolution 1244 continues to be relied on by Serbia, Kosovo and Serbia are unlikely to be willing to fulfill their obligations under the Agreement and Implementation Annex, and normalise their relationship. The issues are too intractable, and unless both sides can muster up the courage to compromise, the current revolving door of provocations, ill will and resentment will continue to dominate the horizon, with the possibility of more violence.
Moreover, amid the current stalemate, it is unlikely that either country will gain accession to the EU, to which both aspire.
While I have great respect for Josep Borrell and Miroslav Lajcak, the EU facilitators of the dialogue, it may be time for a change since there have been no positive developments in normalisation in well over the past year, despite their tireless efforts. Something has to change, or the merry-go-round will continue to spin haplessly, to the detriment of the regular citizens of both countries who deserve a peaceful, normal life for their children and families.
