After Ukraine and Moldova started membership negotiations, would-be members of the EU in the Balkans need to take an ‘all for one and one for all’ approach to accession – or risk remaining stuck in the waiting room.
As Ukraine and Moldova began formal accession talks with the EU last week, the occasion reminded observers of the Western Balkans Six and their long stay in the membership waiting room.
While many will call for the EU to move faster to integrate Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, these aspiring member states must also consider what they can do to contribute to enlargement momentum.
By pooling their resources and working together, they can act for a catalyst that can mitigate and potentially overcome some of the challenges.
The recent election results in North Macedonia have soured the mood. The return to power of the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE party – some eight years after it was ousted – has been interpreted as payback for the concessions that the previous Social Democratic government made to Greece through the 2018 Prespa Agreement without receiving a due reward from the EU, though other important factors were also at play.
While Nikola Gruevski, North Macedonia’s former prime minister, lies low in Budapest, his political compatriots march back into office, determined to unpick many elements of the Prespa deal, which obliged the country to change its name to North Macedonia. New president Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova notably refused to refer to “North Macedonia” when taking the oath of office.
A bumpy ride awaits that will remind Europe of the promises it has made. Former Prime Minister Zoran Zaev lamented in an interview with BIRN recently that Brussels’ failure to fulfill its promises to the country had demotivated pro-EU voters in the election, and had aided the return to power of VMRO-DPMNE.
Politicians throughout the Western Balkans are not blind to the implications. If you make the compromises demanded of you, don’t hold your breath waiting for the benefits to accrue. They are not guaranteed to materialise, at least not within your political lifespan. Nor is North Macedonia the only example; Kosovo waited years for visa liberalisation, despite fulfilling the conditions the EU had requested.
The supposed new sense of momentum injected by Ukraine and Moldova may have inspired functionaries in Brussels, but it has hardly resonated among those in the Western Balkans expected to demonstrate gratitude for a renewed enlargement path.
Region lacks a collective voice
Given this gloomy state of affairs, the region is crying out for effective leadership and sense of direction. It lacks, however, a collective voice that can act as an engine of enlargement, harassing Brussels and individual member states to do more to deliver on their commitments.
Were the Western Balkans Six, for example, to insist that the EU either takes all of them at the same time, or none of them at all, threats to derail the process through the use of vetoes, often for rather spurious reasons, would be diluted.
Sadly, there is no sense of “all for one, and one for all”. The example of the sustained coordination and advocacy of the Visegrad Four – Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia – remains only an intriguing historical footnote for the Western Balkans to reflect upon.
No country seriously contemplates replicating this model. Serbia, arguably the most viable and influential candidate, seems unwilling to assume the mantle of regional leadership. Nor could assume such a role even were it so willing. Scepticism about Belgrade in Sarajevo and Pristina is too profound, with few signs that these relationships will be mended anytime soon.
The example of the Open Balkan initiative – whether viewed as a complement or rival to the Berlin Process – epitomises the challenges of building sustained regional cooperation under Belgrade’s auspices. Half of the Western Balkans Six are in, the other half out.
It is also far from clear that the EU and the individual member states would welcome such a coordinated approach. For the member states, the various junctures of the accession process provide leverage over other priorities, whether vis-a-vis the aspirant member itself, or in the corridors of Brussels.
Hungary’s position on Ukraine, for example, is in part motivated by a desire to fend off EU pressure over issues such as the rule of law and democratic contestation. Enlargement veto points have been, and can be, exploited for domestic political gain.
The EU, meanwhile, appears keen to champion Montenegro’s membership bid as a means of demonstrating that accession remains a tangible goal for the Western Balkans. Easy to absorb, given its small size, and relatively uncontroversial for European populations, there is a temptation to see Podgorica as an easy win for the Union.
This regional dynamic is further complicated by an emerging notion of politicised enlargement, which encourages political leaders to jockey and lobby the member states to back their own horse. They are elbowing each other as the fences approach.
Yet, while aspiring members may secure an ally or two, convincing themselves in the process of a fast track to membership, it is a fool’s errand. As things stand, one dissenting voice is sufficient to stymie all implicit promises.
The entire Western Balkans will instead continue to languish in the waiting room, hoping to be saved by Ukraine, and by an EU intent on demonstrating that it can solve problems in its own back yard.
The European parliamentary elections results have further compounded the problems facing enlargement, even if some reassure themselves by insisting that things could have been worse.
An arguably bleaker future awaits the Western Balkans Six unless they can find a way to work together towards EU membership. The road will still be fraught with difficulties, but they will be fewer and more manageable if they pool their capital and capabilities.
While it may seem unpalatable for some at this stage, the benefits of collaboration can hopefully persuade skeptics about the virtues of partnership. Blaming the EU may well be the default position – but it is time to consider what the Western Balkans itself can do differently.
