The dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia appears to be moving towards a troubling scenario in which ‘no solution is a solution’ may become the default stance of the international community, particularly among EU capitals.
The European Union’s efforts to facilitate the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia have reached a critical juncture. Despite years of dialogue and the signing of dozens of agreements, the process has stagnated and tensions have escalated.
The Banjska incident in September 2023, condemned by the European Parliament as a terrorist attack by Serb gunmen on Kosovo police, underscored the fragility of the current status quo and the limitations of the EU approach.
As critics point out, the bloc’s reliance on constructive ambiguity and its limited role as a facilitator, rather than mediator, have hindered progress and risked deepening instability in the region.
Trust is also an issue.
As diplomat from an EU member state told me, “We do not trust the Kosovo government, and the Kosovo government does not trust us.”
Amid a growing sense that neither the EU nor the United States sees the current government in Kosovo as a reliable partner capable of advancing the process in the right direction, the dialogue seems to be moving towards a troubling scenario in which ‘no solution is a solution’ may become the default stance of the international community, particularly among EU capitals.
This outcome risks solidifying the status quo, perpetuating Kosovo’s isolation and deepening interethnic tensions, all while threatening regional stability.
The situation has been further complicated by Serbia’s outright refusal to comply with the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation, APN, as exemplified by the December 2023 letter from then Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic to the European External Action Service, formally rejecting the agreement that the EU had announced had been accepted by both countries in March 2023.
The APN was formally endorsed by all 27 EU member states in the European Council conclusions in February and March of 2023 and is considered by the EU as “binding in its entirety under international law”.
The controversy surrounding the APN, arguably the most significant agreement between Kosovo and Serbia since the dialogue began in 2011, and developments during the 12-hour talks in Ohrid, North Macedonia, revealed both the diminishing agency of the EU and the US in the process and the limitations of strategies such as constructive ambiguity.
The Ohrid summit demonstrated that ‘kicking the can down the road’ was no longer feasible, yet changing this approach has proven difficult for the EU. A decade of reliance on constructive ambiguity has taken its toll, making it challenging to shift strategies.
Even the APN, which marked a departure of sorts, has encountered significant obstacles due to this entrenched practice. Notably, the APN broke with past practices by explicitly referring to Kosovo and Serbia, rather than using the more ambiguous terms ‘Belgrade and Pristina’.
The limits of ambiguity
Constructive ambiguity has been a cornerstone of the EU’s approach to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. By employing vague language, the EU has allowed both parties to interpret agreements in ways that align with their interests, thereby keeping the negotiations alive. However, this strategy is not without its drawbacks. While it has enabled short-term progress, it has also created space for divergent interpretations, leading to stalemates and crises instead of effective implementation.
A clear example is the ambiguity surrounding the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, which has exacerbated ethnic divisions and heightened tensions. The dismissive attitude of both the European Commission and the Kosovo government toward disinformation campaigns targeting the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities has further deepened the challenges surrounding its establishment, illustrating the broader issues with the EU’s approach.
However, while the need for change in the dialogue for normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is clear, change in approach and thinking is also urgently needed inside Kosovo.
While Serbia’s actions have undoubtedly contributed to the ongoing impasse, it has become increasingly clear to observers of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue that Serbian President Aleksander Vucic is not genuinely seeking a solution with Kosovo. His strategy seems focused on maintaining the status quo or creating conditions favourable to the separation of northern Kosovo. What remains puzzling, however, is why the Kosovo government would seemingly play into his hands – or as the saying goes in Kosovo, ‘put water in his well’.
The Kosovo government’s decision to forcibly install ethnic Albanian mayors in Serb-majority municipalities in the north, despite low voter turnout and fierce opposition from the local Serb community, was condemned by the so-called ‘Quint’ countries – the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy – as heavy-handed. Although the government’s actions were legal and – as the government argues – designed to uphold the rule of law, they have exacerbated tensions and undermined trust.
The lack of coordination and consultation with international partners on this and other actions in the north has further strained Kosovo’s relationships.
Restrictive measures applied against Kosovo by the EU and US remain in effect and include the suspension of the work of structures under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Kosovo and the EU, suspension of bilateral visits unrelated to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, freezing of funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and the freezing of proposals submitted by Kosovo under the Western Balkans Investment Framework.
While the Kosovo government’s actions in the north of the country have had one notable positive outcome – the dismantling of the criminal network led by Milan Radoicic, the ringleader of the Banjska attack in September 2023 – other measures have been far more problematic.
Actions such as banning the use of the Serbian dinar, closing Serbian post offices that served the Kosovo Serb community in the north and last weekend’s shutdown of Serbian-backed so-called ‘parallel institutions’ were undertaken without proper coordination with the EU and the US, and without adequate transitional phases or preparations.
What is equally striking is the unprecedented level of secrecy and lack of transparency in the current Kosovo government’s approach to the normalisation dialogue. Information from the government about the process is scarce. Journalists say they often struggle to even confirm meetings in Brussels with the Kosovo government, making coverage difficult.
For Kosovo to regain the confidence of its international partners and effectively counter Serbia’s narrative, the government must reflect on these issues and take concrete steps to improve transparency, coordination, and respect for the rights of all communities in the country. This is one side of the coin; on the other, the EU must reset the dialogue and change its approach.
Reset required
In the same way that Video Assistant Referee, VAR technology has brought some clarity to disputed decisions on the football pitch, the Kosovo-Serbia normalisation dialogue urgently needs a similar mechanism.
A VAR-like system would not only serve as a retrospective tool to analyse past missteps but also function as a continuous, real-time oversight mechanism. By embedding this level of oversight into the dialogue, the EU can keep the process on track, promptly correct any missteps, and consistently hold all parties to account.
The recent escalation of tensions has underscored the urgent need for the EU to impose greater clarity in the upcoming rounds of talks. The era of constructive ambiguity must come to an end; the EU must provide precise, unambiguous definitions and expectations within agreements, along with a clearly defined end-goal for the process, which should be articulated through conclusions of the European Council. This shift is not just advisable but essential to prevent further crises.
At the core of the EU’s conflict mediation strategy are two closely related but distinct concepts: mediation and facilitation. The limitations of the EU’s role as a facilitator have become increasingly apparent, particularly in its inability to overcome the entrenched positions of Kosovo and Serbia. These constraints hinder the EU’s ability to address the fundamental issues at the heart of the Kosovo-Serbia conflict.
In contrast, adopting a mediation role would grant the EU the authority to propose solutions, take greater responsibility for ensuring their implementation, and hold both Kosovo and Serbia accountable for their commitments. This shift is critical not only to break the ongoing stalemate but also to strengthen the EU’s role and make its involvement more transparent.
Furthermore, the EU should craft a clear and credible package of incentives for progress in the dialogue, along with consequences for actions that undermine it. The success of the EU’s facilitation/mediation efforts depends on the cohesive support of all relevant EU institutions and member states. The European Commission, European Council, and individual member states must coordinate closely to ensure that the mediator has the necessary backing to enforce decisions and maintain momentum in the dialogue.
In the past, the divergent interests and positions among EU member states vis-à-vis the work of the European Commission in the normalisation dialogue, have undermined the credibility of the Commission and been detrimental to the sustainable normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
When EU member states and the European Commission are not aligned in their approaches or objectives, it creates inconsistencies that weaken the overall effectiveness of the EU’s efforts.
This lack of cohesion not only confuses the parties involved in the dialogue but also signals a lack of unified commitment from the EU, which can be exploited by those who are less inclined to make meaningful compromise.
To ensure the effectiveness of this shift, the EU must address the limitations observed during the tenure of its envoy Miroslav Lajcak. The EU should strengthen the agency of the facilitator/mediator. This authority should encompass both the power to offer incentives and the ability to impose consequences for non-compliance, ensuring that the mediator can act decisively on behalf of the EU.
